Re-reading the theory of ghurur (deceit) in Imami jurisprudence and the four schools, relying on the effect of the knowledge and ignorance of the deceived on ḍamān al-yad (possessory liability); a critique of Iranian judicial practice.

Jamei, Mohammad Amin; Hoseyni, Seyed Hassan; Asadi Kooh Bad, Hormoz

doi:10.22034/icwj.2026.583598.1048

Re-reading the theory of ghurur (deceit) in Imami jurisprudence and the four schools, relying on the effect of the knowledge and ignorance of the deceived on ḍamān al-yad (possessory liability); a critique of Iranian judicial practice.

Document Type : Original Research Article

Authors

Mohammad Amin Jamei ¹

Seyed Hassan Hoseyni ²

Hormoz Asadi Kooh Bad ¹

¹ Department of Law, Ramh.C., Islamic Azad University, Ramhormoz, Iran.

² )Department of Law, Ramh.C., Islamic Azad University, Ramhormoz, Iran.

10.22034/icwj.2026.583598.1048

Abstract

Ghurur (deception) in Islamic jurisprudence addresses the liability of a person who, by creating customary trust, leads another to a harmful act. The main issue is the impact of the deceived person's knowledge and ignorance on the establishment of liability of possession (Daman Yad) and the scope of the deceiver's responsibility. This study re-examines the jurisprudential foundations of Ghurur in Imami jurisprudence and the four Sunni schools, determining the effect of the deceived person's knowledge and ignorance on the distribution of liability, while critiquing Iranian judicial practice. A descriptive-analytical method with an inferential and comparative approach was employed. In Imami jurisprudence, the deceived person's non-negligent ignorance establishes ultimate liability on the deceiver, although initial liability of possession remains with the deceived person. In cases of knowledge or negligent ignorance, recourse to the deceiver is barred or limited. In Hanafi and Maliki schools, "generic deception" (taghrir naw'i) and customary criteria play a more prominent role, sometimes maintaining liability even with the deceived person's knowledge. Iranian judicial practice, by failing to distinguish between initial possession liability and ultimate responsibility, has issued inconsistent rulings. Distinguishing between the two stages and precisely considering the deceived person's degree of awareness is necessary for jurisprudential coherence and alignment with legal principles.

Keywords

Keywords: Ghurur

Daman Yad

Knowledge and Ignorance of the Deceived

Comparative Jurisprudence

Iranian Judicial Practice

Subjects